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THE SHAKY POLITICAL ECONOMY
FOUNDATION OF A NATIONAL
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
REQUIREMENT
Jim Rossi*
This Article argues that a national renewable portfolio standard
(RPS) for electric power is not likely to advance its purported goals,
nor is it likely to be adopted by Congress in its present proposed
form. For one, a national RPS would have geographically dispropor-
tionate costs-those costs would be focused on a few, mostly natural
resource-poor states, whereas the benefits of job growth and technol-
ogical adoption in infant industries will be elsewhere. Second, the
ability of firms to use operational flexibility regarding their nonre-
newable fuel mix to substitute other nonrenewable energy sources for
traditional fossil fuels undermines the purported climate change bene-
fits of such a requirement, and usually raises costs and increases inef-
ficiency of energy generation as well. Furthermore, a national RPS
fails to address preexisting system-level infrastructure siting and cost
allocation barriers in the electric power industry. Without broader re-
forms to the energy industry, significant new investment in renewable
power is unlikely.
I. INTRODUCrION
Federal climate change initiatives commonly sprout from the politi-
cal economy claim that national solutions better match the geographic
scope of the problem at hand than do state or local approaches. Con-
cerns that environmental law must make some effort to scale regulatory
solutions to the scope of the problems presented are heavily debated in
environmental law and federalism.' In comparison to many other envi-
* Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University
College of Law. Email: jrossi@law.fsu.edu. Thanks to Dino Falaschetti, Dan Farber, Jay Kesan, Urna
Outka, and Mark Seidenfeld and to participants in a workshop at the University of Texas School of
Law and the annual biofuels conference at the University of Illinois for their comments on a draft.
1. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 130, 131-40 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570,570-74 (1996).
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ronmental issues, the conventional wisdom is that climate change itself is
a problem that is more national or international in scope, rather than lo-
calized, in the linkage between activities and the harms they produce.2 It
is for this reason that the predominantly suggested solution in environ-
mental law is a national approach to addressing the problem of climate
change over state and local solutions, with the federal government play-
ing the dominant role in articulating and enforcing standards.'
Against the grain of this conventional wisdom, I argue in this Ar-
ticle that the political economy foundations for national renewable fuel
requirements in the electric power industry are dubious given their geo-
graphically concentrated costs and effects on firm behavior, which calls
into question any climate change benefits. For more than thirty years,
federal law has been used to expand development of renewable sources
of electric power. In the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA), Congress required utilities to buy back the surplus power
from alternative generators, subsidizing the growth of many non-fossil
fuel sources of electric power.' Subsequent energy statutes and budget
bills have contained a variety of incentives and production subsidies
(many temporary) for developers of renewable power projects.' Despite
these federal legislative efforts and similar proposals at the state level,
growth of renewable power sources as a share of the overall nationwide
portfolio of electric power generation has remained relatively flat, with
renewable sources other than hydroelectric power representing only
three to four percent of the nation's overall power generation portfolio
today, a slight increase from 1990.6
2. Cf Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (maintaining that national climate change policies will be more
effective than local ones).
3. See id. (arguing that the state-level effort to combat climate change is not the best course of
action).
4. Section 210 of PURPA provided for avoided cost rates for qualifying small power production
facilities, including those using wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal to produce electric power. Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117, 3144-47. The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to termi-
nate a utility's obligation to buy electricity from qualifying facilities in workably competitive regional
markets. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594, 967-98.
5. Subsidies include direct tax credits, grants, and low interest loans. In FY 2007, it is estimated
that federal subsidies supporting renewable energy sources totaled $4.9 billion, more than tripling the
$1.4 billion annual subsidies for renewables provided in FY 1999. Production tax credits to wind pro-
ducers alone totaled $666 million in FY 2007. See Energy in Brief How Much Does the Federal Gov-
ernment Spend on Energy-Specific Subsidies and Support?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.
eia.doe.gov/energy-in_brieflenergysubsidies.cfm (last updated Sept. 8, 2008).
6. Forecasts for future growth in renewable power projects in the electric power industry re-
main optimistic. Historical data shows growth in new renewable projects, but the overall percentage
of renewable power in the nation's electric power generation portfolio has remained relatively flat. In
2009, renewable energy constituted 8% of the nation's energy supply, with 53% of that renewable
energy contributing to the generation of electricity consumed by U.S. customers. The bulk of the re-
newable energy used for electricity generation was hydroelectric (66%) and wind (17%). See Energy
in Brief How Much of Our Electricity Is Generated from Renewable Sources?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy-in-brief/renewableenergy.cfm (last updated Sept. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Energy in Brief]. Nationwide growth of renewables has been fairly flat and overall they
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Recent proposals at the national level draw on the experience of
dozens of states to endorse a requirement for utilities to use renewable
power in their generation portfolios, or to purchase or pay others to de-
velop renewable resources. Industry leaders have called for a national
approach to renewable energy requirements.' In the academic legal lit-
erature, a national renewable power mandate also has enthusiastic sup-
porters: commentators" have advanced systematic arguments that a na-
tional renewable portfolio standard (RPS) can pave the way to wide-
spread development of renewable resources, increased energy security
and sustainability, and climate change mitigation. Echoing the predomi-
nant view in recent national climate change proposals in environmental
law, proposals to adopt a national RPS rather than rely on state man-
dates claim that regulation needs to match or tailor its solutions to the
scope of the geographic problem that regulators are attempting to ad-
dress.'
The federal government has extensive experience in using a range
of tools-including subsidies, grants, and technology forcing standards-
as a lever to induce technological change in the energy industry. At best,
the results have been mixed. 0 The reality is that developers of renewa-
ble power projects face significant economic and legal obstacles-ranging
from high relative project and operational costs, to significant infrastruc-
ture siting and cost allocation barriers. Even if renewable power were
required, the ability of renewable energy projects to compete on a large
scale with more conventional forms of power generation will be in se-
rious question given these barriers."
This Article argues that the national RPS creates incentives for
firms that undermine its political economy foundations and its climate
change goals-limiting the ability of such a proposal to garner stable po-
litical support. Part II highlights how, contrary to the conventional claim
may not have increased as an overall portion of the power industry's generation portfolio. In 1990,
renewables constituted 7.4% of energy consumed. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, PUB. No. 0561(92), RENEWABLE RESOURCES IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 5 (1993),
http://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/electricity/renewmas.pdf. Wind (9% of renewable resources) has expe-
rienced the most significant growth of renewable sources in recent years. See Energy in Brief, supra
note 6.
7. See, e.g., Daniel P. Krueger & Andre Begosso, Mandating Federal Renewables, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Jan. 2010, at 40,41.
8. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1339, 1370-75, 1382-84 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact
of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 55-59,
76-77 (2008).
9. See Davies, supra note 8, at 1397; Fershee, supra note 8, at 76-77.
10. See Gary E. Marchant, Sustainable Energy Technologies: Ten Lessons from the History of
Technology Regulation, 18 WIDENER L.J. 831, 834 (2009) ("Notwithstanding the many available legal
options for attempting to induce technology change in energy supply and demand, forcing beneficial
technology change is a difficult endeavor.").
11. One of these obstacles is the lack of large-scale transmission to serve renewable projects. See
Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the
"Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 COLO. L. REV. 705 (2010).
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among national RPS advocates, the costs of a national RPS (at least in its
present form) are focused on a few states and the climate change benefits
are overstated. Even where an RPS mandate applies, most utilities re-
tain planning and operational flexibility regarding their nonrenewable
fuel mix. Such a mandate in these situations can produce substitution ef-
fects that may have other unintended consequences.
Part III addresses possible solutions to promote the development of
renewable power. At the very least, a national RPS could be repackaged
to be more effective and garner widespread political support. Ultimate-
ly, however, the distributional, inefficiency, and substitutability problems
created by a national RPS are more effectively addressed by other regu-
latory approaches that provide a stronger case for federal regulation,
such as broad-based national subsidies, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade, or
broader approaches to energy resource management. I conclude that a
national RPS lacks a credible political rationale for national regulation
and is not economically effective. Instead, large-scale development of
renewable power depends on more fundamental reforms to the electric
power system.
II. CRACKS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDATIONS OF A
NATIONAL RPS
A national RPS would build on the approach of as many as thirty-
five states that already require or encourage that a certain percentage of
power utilities sales come from renewable sources.12 Various energy bills
at the federal level incorporate a national RPS, including the Waxman-
Markey Bill, which the U.S. House of Representatives approved in
2009.13 Given that comprehensive legislative efforts to address climate
change have stalled, some more recent federal proposals contemplate
adding a national RPS as part of an energy-only bill that would not ad-
dress carbon emissions.14
A. National RPS Proposals
The proposed national RPS contains a basic mandate, echoing the
requirements of many state RPSs, that a certain percentage of power
12. See Davies, supra note 8, at 1341-42; see also Federal Incentives, DATABASE OF ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2011)
(providing summary tables and summary maps of "state, local, utility and federal incentives and poli-
cies promot[ing] renewable energy and energy efficiency" and funded by the U.S. Department of
Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy).
13. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. sees. 101-03.
14. See Simon Lomax & Lisa Lerer, Democrats Fail to Reach Agreement on Energy Bill (Up-
date2), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 24, 2010, 6:31 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-06-24/democrats-fail-to-reach-agreement-on-energy-bill-update2-.html (noting the possibil-
ity of a bill mandating renewable energy but failing to address carbon emissions).
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sold or produced by utilities come from renewable sources." Although
this mandate feature of the national RPS parallels requirements in many
states, the national RPS would do something many state RPSs do not-
national RPS proposals would unify the national market by creating a
nationwide renewable energy credit (REC) market, including for those
states that do not have access to natural resources to develop renewable
sources of power generation.'"
Under the Waxman-Markey Bill (formally known as the American
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) Climate Bill) 7 electricity pro-
viders are required to meet a minimum share of annual sales with elec-
tricity savings and qualifying renewable generation.' Renewable targets
would begin at six percent in 2012 and rise to twenty percent by 2020.9
Firms could meet their national RPS requirement by either selling power
from qualified sources or purchasing RECs. Qualifying renewable gen-
eration sources could sell, trade, and bank federal RECs for three years
following the generation of electric power.20 ACES also contains a sav-
ings provision which would preserve individual state RPSs while estab-
lishing the federal RPS21 -making the federal RPS a floor while allowing
states to go further, much like many other environmental standards.
State approaches to encouraging renewable power in the form of an
RPS mandate are imperfect. Individual state RPSs vary substantially:
more than one dozen states have no requirement, and among those that
have adopted one, requirements range from a modest four percent to as
high as thirty percent at the more ambitious end of the spectrum. 22 En-
forcement of state RPS requirements also varies, with some states apply-
ing hard mandates and others taking a more lenient approach. 23  Both
proponents24 and opponents25 of a national RPS join issue in their recog-
15. H.R. 2454, sec. 101(a), § 610(b).
16. Even though many state RPS programs allow for RECs, these programs do not currently
enable a nationwide REC market. See Davies, supra note 8, at 1378-79.
17. H.R. 2454.
18. This requirement applies to providers who sell more than four hundred million megawatts
per year. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(a)(18)(A), (d). Qualifying renewable resources include solar, wind,
renewable biomass, landfill gas, and geothermal, but not nuclear. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(a)(17) (defin-
ing "renewable energy resource"). Although not included as qualifying renewable resources, sales of
generation from new nuclear, new carbon capture and sequestration, and existing hydropower capaci-
ty would be deducted from a retail provider's total sales for determining whether the requirement was
met. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(a)(19).
19. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(d). Up to one-quarter of these targets could be met with energy effi-
ciency measures (and individual state governors could petition to raise this amount to two-fifths). Id.
sec. 101(a), § 610(b)(3)-(4).
20. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(e)(9)-(10).
21. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(k).
22. See Renewable Portfolio Standards Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable-fs.html (last updated Apr. 2009).
23. Davies, supra note 8, at 1379-81.
24. Id. at 1389-90.
25. Robert J. Michaels, A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What's Not to Like?,
POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., D.C.), Nov. 13, 2008, at 1, 14-17 [hereinafter Michaels, What's Not to
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nition that state RPSs have not been effective at significantly increasing
reliance on renewable resources in the mix of generation sources for
electric power.
A national RPS is seen as a way of "fostering renewables develop-
ment through an effective and efficient market, a market where geogra-
phy does not matter." 26 Unfortunately, however, in its present formula-
tion the national RPS is also hobbled by realities. Of course, legislation
such as a national RPS may have some symbolic value by shaping public
attitudes and changing social norms over time.27 As a practical policy
matter, however, evaluating the desirability of a national RPS requires
an assessment of whether its costs justify the benefits. The costs of
adopting a national RPS in its present form would be concentrated with-
in a few states (many of which are natural resource-poor), rather than
spread evenly among all states. It is not new to claim that the costs of
climate change initiatives may be disproportionately concentrated on
certain states-that concern, for example, has also plagued national de-
bates surrounding cap-and-trade-but the national RPS also presents a
dubious claim of climate change benefits. Many of the purported bene-
fits of a national RPS are geographically widespread, but the most diffuse
benefits (in the form of climate change reduction) are also the most ques-
tionable. Of the purported benefits that would accompany a national
RPS, for example, job growth, technological adoption in infant indus-
tries, and the like, many are not concentrated in the states that would
bear the costs, casting doubt on the political economy claim used to sup-
port national regulation in this context. The significance of these cracks
in the foundation not only highlight the likely inefficiency of a national
RPS; they also reveal the political obstacles supporters face in garnering
a sufficiently strong coalition to convince Congress to adopt a national
RPS.
B. The Concentrated Costs of a National RPS
Commentators have boldly claimed that one of the virtues of the
RPS is that it "is not a tax."' In effect, however, any mandate to use re-
newable power must either be financed by firms or by consumers.29 The
current approach to RPSs, which varies from state to state, applies a
mandate only to firms within each individual state that has adopted an
RPS." By contrast, a national RPS would apply to all firms regardless of
Like]; Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Ges-
ture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79,102-05 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture].
26. Davies, supra note 8, at 1364.
27. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2045-46
(1996).
28. Davies, supra note 8, at 1391.
29. See Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1425, 1433-36 (2010) (making similar point).
30. See Federal Incentives, supra note 12.
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location and must either be paid for by each firm's customers (if passed
on through regulated rates) or absorbed by the firm as a cost.'
Much of the debate regarding the cost of RPSs is focused on the
impact that an RPS will have on average consumer rates. Studies suggest
that on average the impact of RPS mandates on customer rates (in states
where they have been adopted) is as low as one percent-a relatively mi-
nimal impact on average rates.12 Thus the significance of a national RPS
is not its aggregate impact, but its distributional impact across various
state, region, and customer groups. Any regulatory approach to promote
renewables through a national RPS mandate will have different subsidy
impacts for customers across states. Therefore, much like a tax, the
mandate needs to be assessed from the perspective of who bears the bur-
den, as well as whether the implicit redistribution reflected in the RPS is
fair and efficient.
The simple reality is that, in the energy industry, geography matters:
renewable resource access varies greatly across the regions of the United
States. For example, southeastern states have strong potential for bio-
mass development, but in comparison to most western states, they have
very limited opportunities for the development of wind, solar, and geo-
thermal." It should not be surprising that the geographic distribution of
natural resources varies across states based on regional weather and land
variations. Although only a minority of states may need to conform to
the new requirements of a national RPS, it appears that much of that
burden will be concentrated on states that bear higher costs in complying
with an RPS than states that are resource-rich?4
31. Given rate regulation in most states, whether the cost is passed on to customers depends on
what state regulators do with the increases in costs for compliance with a national RPS.
32. In March 2007, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) released an analysis of
twenty-eight different state or utility-level RPS cost impact studies over the previous decade. Nine-
teen studies predicted rate increases of no greater than one percent, only two projected increases of
greater than five percent, and six studies projected rate decreases. The LBNL calculated that the me-
dian impact on a monthly residential electric bill of an RPS would be thirty-eight cents. CLIFF CHEN
ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., PUB. NO. 61580, WEIGHING THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY IMPACT PROJECTIONS, at i (2007), http://eetd.lbl.gov/ealems/reports/
61580.pdf. When other possible benefits of renewable energy facilities are factored in, such as avoid-
ing the environmental externalities associated with mining and transportation of fossil fuels, reducing
emissions from fossil fuel generation and avoiding the associated health costs due to those emissions,
and reducing power plant costs and risks associated with construction, the minimal cost impact does
not seem to be a barrier to the adoption of an RPS. It is notable, however, that this study focuses on
states that have already adopted an RPS, which as a general matter are more resource-rich from the
perspective of renewable project development than states that have not yet adopted an RPS.
33. For example, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory offers a series of dynamic maps
showing variation in biomass, geothermal, solar, and wind potential. See Renewable Resources Maps
& Data, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/renewable-resources/ (last updated
Sept. 29, 2010).
34. One of the only empirical studies of states adopting RPSs determined that in-state RPS re-
quirements are more likely to be adopted by states with poor air quality that are rich in renewable
resources with low amounts of existing renewable electricity generation. In other words, states have
adopted RPSs when local benefits are high and local costs are very low. See Thomas P. Lyon & Hai-
tao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation 1 (Aug.
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A national RPS thus serves as a form of wealth transfer from resi-
dents in states that lack natural resources to states that have resources
rich for development and export related to renewable power project de-
velopment. Some degree of redistribution with the transition from state-
centered to national RPS approaches seems inevitable. Perhaps if states
with heavy population bases favored such reforms they might be able to
garner a sufficient majority to convince members of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Waxman-Markey suggests that this may have occurred. To
the extent that this redistribution is geographically concentrated within
states in specific regions of the country, however, any legislative effort to
adopt a national RPS must overcome obstacles necessary to garner sup-
port in Congress, especially those hurdles presented by the Senate (one
of which allows each state the same amount of votes).
C. The Limited Practical Benefits of a National RPS
One criticism of technology-forcing standards or mandates in envi-
ronmental regulation is that in many instances regulators have failed to
pay attention to what Timothy Malloy refers to as "micro-market" ef-
fects." Such effects include resource allocation decisions by firms and
their constituent actors as they consider how to respond to regulation.3 6
Sometimes, the response by firms will be consonant with other regulato-
ry objectives, but sometimes the micro-market effects of firms may lead
to conduct that departs from the broader intended goals of a regulatory
system. Thus, a regulatory mandate may ultimately cause substitutions
from one undesirable behavior to another.
The impact of the national regulatory mandate altering ethanol re-
quirements in gasoline refining provides an example of deleterious mi-
cro-market effects. The combination of subsidies and regulatory man-
dates for corn-based ethanol have had the unintended effect of
significantly increasing food prices as land for food crops has shifted to
growing corn for fuel." This shift in production decisions has impacted
the price of food for citizens of developing nations, contributing to the
global food shortage." Additionally, cultivation of corn for biofuels ad-
versely impacts the environment. For example, increased agricultural
17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1025513.
35. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L.
REv. 531, 535-37 (2002).
36. Id. at 536.
37. See Marchant, supra note 10, at 843-44; Clifford Krauss, Ethanol, Just Recently a Savior, Is
Struggling, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2009, at Al.
38. Lewis J. Perelman, The Near-Term Potential of Climate-Friendly Technologies, in 37 AICGS
POLICY REPORT: SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS TO THE CLIMATE AND ENERGY CHALLENGE 7, 15 (2008),
http://www.aicgs.org/documents/pubs/polrep37.pdf.
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production has increased pollution runoff into the Chesapeake Bay from
surrounding farms."
Similarly, an RPS mandate can affect firm behavior and produce
unintended consequences. Because renewable approaches to generating
electric power emit fewer greenhouse gases (GHG) than their alterna-
tives (primarily fossil fuels), it is frequently maintained that a national
RPS could help to mitigate climate change.40 Due to operational deci-
sions of firms, however, this also appears to be the most questionable
benefit of a national RPS mandate. Specifically, mandates can have ad-
verse substitution effects on firms in the energy industry and may lead
firms in their planning and operational decisions to substitute their
supply load in favor of using the lowest-costing fossil fuels (such as coal)
rather than adopting approaches to generate electric power that have
lower carbon emissions (such as natural gas).4 1
For example, an electricity utility's power supply portfolio typically
includes a range of options, from nuclear to coal to natural gas to hydro,
wind, and solar. An RPS mandate requires firms to allocate their finan-
cial resources to either produce or procure electric power from sources
that are significantly more costly than traditional fossil fuels, such as
coal.4 2 Like any other business, a utility firm is unlikely to absorb the
costs of compliance with an RPS from its own profit margins. To the ex-
tent that a firm's demand for various approaches of obtaining electricity
is elastic (in other words, responsive to changes in price), an RPS may
lead to substitution away from more expensive forms of producing elec-
tric power and towards the firm's least expensive options. Based on his-
torical and market prices of fuel, coal-which already comprises nearly
half of the United States' electric power generation 43-has one of the
lowest marginal costs for firms seeking to generate electric power, espe-
cially given the existence of substantial power generation and transporta-
tion infrastructure supporting the use of coal." Coal is also one of the
dirtiest fuels, and, by a wide margin, has the largest carbon impact of fu-
els used in electric power production. 45
39. Id.; see also Marchant, supra note 10, at 844.
40. Davies, supra note 8, at 1370-72.
41. This argument is developed in greater detail in Rossi, supra note 29, at 1436-41.
42. See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of
"Cheap" Electricity, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 407 (2010) (discussing coal); see also PAUL KOMOR, PEW CTR.
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, WIND AND SOLAR ELECTRICITY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
6, 12-13 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/wind-solar-electricity-report.pdf (discussing
wind and solar generated electricity).
43. In 2008, coal comprised nearly fifty percent of generation capacity for electric power in the
United States. See Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity-in the-united-states (last up-
dated Oct. 18,2010).
44. J.W. Anderson, Coal: Dirty Cheap Energy, RESOURCES, Winter 2005, at 31, 32.
45. See id.; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 0573(2008), EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2008, at 2 (2009), ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/
cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057308.pdf.
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By contrast, natural gas, which currently comprises nearly twenty
percent of electric power production capacity, is typically more expensive
and subject to greater market price variation than coal.4 6 Natural gas,
however, has one of the lowest carbon impacts of any fossil fuel.47 Thus,
natural gas is frequently advocated as a desirable fuel in the electric
power industry, especially for purposes of GHG reduction and global
warming mitigation.48  Although more expensive than coal, the costs of
using natural gas to generate electricity remain below the costs of wind
and substantially below the costs of solar and many other renewable
technologies.49 To the extent that an RPS leads firms to substitute away
from natural gas and towards coal-generated electricity in their planning
and operational decisions, it will undermine any GHG reduction goal of
a national RPS. For example, a Resources for the Future study con-
cluded that, "[t]he RPS tends to encourage renewables largely at the ex-
pense of natural gas, and thus is less effective at reducing carbon emis-
sions than would be a direct tax on carbon emissions."" In terms of both
cost and operational considerations, new renewable generation is most
likely to displace natural gas plants that are switched on and off as
needed because they are efficient and low-cost options."
If an RPS mandate is not financed in a way that provides complete
cost recovery to firms-so as to leave a firm neutral with respect to its re-
source allocation decisions-an RPS would likely incentivize substitu-
tions away from natural gas toward coal as a fuel source for the nonre-
newable portion of its generation portfolio.52 Such substitution, however,
46. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 32.
47. "Natural gas produces 43 percent fewer carbon emissions than coal for each unit of energy
delivered, and 30 percent fewer emissions than oil." Clean Energy: How Natural Gas Works, UNION
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean energy/technology-and-impacts/energy-
technologies/how-natural-gas-works.html (last updated Aug. 31,2010).
48. The American Clean Skies Foundation, along with the UN Foundation and Worldwatch In-
stitute, sponsored a side conference during the Copenhagen talks which emphasized the benefits to
carbon emissions of natural gas. See Aubrey K. McClendon & Gregory C. Staple, NGO Says Natural
Gas Provides New Option for Immediate U.S. Carbon Cuts, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 12, 2009),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ngo-says-natural-gas-provides-new-option-for-immediate-
us-carbon-cuts-79124117.html; see also Pierre Briancon, A Call to Arms from Copenhagen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/business/economy/
Olviews.html ("Cheap gas encourages utilities to build more gas-fired power plants, which are cleaner
than coal-powered ones.").
49. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PUB. No. 0383(2010), ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010
WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 66-67 (2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflaeo/pdf/0383(2010).pdf; see
also 2016 Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources from the Annual Energy Outlook 2010, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (n.d.), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflaeolpdf/2Ol6levelized costsaeo2OlO.pdf.
50. Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, Cost-Effectiveness of Renewable Electricity Policies, 27
ENERGY ECON. 873,874 (2005).
51. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1438-40.
52. Although there is anecdotal evidence that firms do substitute away from natural gas in re-
sponse to regulatory mandates, whether and the extent to which this occurs-and the impacts on GHG
emissions-is ultimately an empirical question. Because many states have had RPS mandates for
some time, this could be studied. One challenge in drawing any conclusions about the implications for
a national RPS from such data, however, is that state regulators often have direct control over fuel mix
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would also increase carbon emissions and thus is inconsistent with the
climate change mitigation goal of the RPS. Even if cost recovery makes
firms neutral regarding substitution away from natural gas, system-wide
operational considerations would likely still favor using less natural gas
for peaking purposes.
Perhaps the most promising benefit of a national RPS is technologi-
cal innovation53 and the growth of a new energy industry that is more at-
tuned to energy sustainability goals.54 To the extent that a national RPS
strengthens the interstate market in RECs, it can encourage states them-
selves to develop new incentives for renewable technologies and provide
greater regulatory stability for developers of renewable projects rather
than relying on the current patchwork of approaches among states." By
increasing the amount of electric power generated by renewable re-
sources, it is maintained that an RPS mandate would promote broad
energy policy goals of energy independence and security.56 Some of these
benefits are geographically widespread, or more diffuse, but other bene-
fits-such as those related to green jobs and employment-are concen-
trated primarily on resource-rich states." Yet these kinds of benefits,
such as the creation of jobs and infant-industry growth, are typically ad-
vanced by firms that are organized at the state, rather than national, lev-
el, especially given large variations in resource availability across regions
of the United States. The ability of states to pursue these benefits on
their own may, at some extreme, be limited by federalism concerns (such
as the dormant Commerce Clause), so allowing a national RPS to
preempt unconstitutional state protectionist measures may be one of the
more significant benefits offered by a national RPS. State politics, how-
ever, still have a lot of leeway to advance the interests of job and infant-
industry growth in renewable power.
III. SHORING UP THE NATIONAL RPS's SHAKY FOUNDATIONS
The distributional and economic effects of a national RPS should
not be ignored. If not properly addressed, these potential problems
could undermine any claim that national regulation is a better regulatory
solution to the scope of the problem than state or local regulation. Poli-
cymakers can address some of these adverse effects without completely
and switching to coal in the context of utility regulatory proceedings. Federal regulators, meanwhile,
would not have such direct control (apart from indirect pollution controls).
53. At the state level, technological innovation may be one of the most significant benefits
created by an RPS and one of the areas RPSs have had the greatest success. See David E. Adelman &
Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ.
L. REv. 835, 866-69 (2008).
54. Davies, supra note 8, at 1366-67.
55. Id. at 1358 (discussing job growth and noting that the core purpose of an RPS is to promote
"a new energy market in renewables to, in turn, spur the transition to a sustainably fueled society").
56. Id. at 1372-74.
57. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1433-35 (making a similar argument).
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abandoning the RPS as a tool-as some have already suggested." Ulti-
mately, national reforms must focus on fixing the cracks in a national
RPS as well as building a new foundation altogether for renewable pow-
er projects-in particular, reducing some of the broader legal and policy
barriers faced by developers of renewable power projects.
A. Fixing the Cracks in the Foundation
Some of the cracks in a national RPS can easily be fixed by small
tweaks to national proposals. Several modifications might help make a
national RPS a more legitimate, politically appealing, and effective regu-
latory tool.
To begin, any national RPS must recognize that access to natural re-
sources and the weather conditions necessary to exploit them are not
equally distributed among all fifty states. Allowing states to meet the
RPS through conservation and efficiency (as does Waxman-Markey, to
an extent59), in addition to developing new renewable technologies or
purchasing RECs, would dampen the disproportionate burden some
states would otherwise be forced to bear under a national RPS mandate.
Under Waxman-Markey's proposed national RPS, only solar, wind,
biomass, landfill gas, and geothermal qualify as renewable sources.6
From the perspective of encouraging economic development and invest-
ment in specific technologies, such an approach seems focused. Yet, fa-
vored technologies change and regulators have a particularly poor track
record in choosing technological winners, which could undermine the
technology-forcing goal of a national RPS. In addition, states that do not
have access to natural resources for development to meet an RPS might
be allowed to meet the federal RPS through the development of nuclear
or other low carbon technologies that have been excluded from the over-
all narrow definition of technologies in a national RPS. Another tech-
nology that regulators should consider including in an RPS is carbon cap-
ture and sequestration. Michigan includes such technologies in its RPS;
however, at least according to a recent survey, other states have not fol-
lowed suit."1
58. See Michaels, What's Not to Like, supra note 25, at 3, 23-25; Michaels, Smart Policy or Mis-
guided Gesture, supra note 25, at 107-10. Michaels also testified before Congress in opposition to
Waxman-Markey-in large part due to its national RPS requirement. See Hearings on the American
Clean Energy Security Act (ACESA) of 2009: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Env't of the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 3-4 (2009) (testimony of Robert J. Michaels, Ph.D.),
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press-111/20090423/testimony-michaels.pdf.
59. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. sec. 101(a),
§ 610(f).
60. Id. sec. 101(a), § 610(a)(17).
61. Michigan allows a portion of its RPS to be met with credits from an "[a]dvanced cleaner
energy system," which is defined, in part, as "[a] coal-fired electric generating facility if 85% or more
of the carbon dioxide emissions are captured and permanently geologically sequestered." MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 460.1003(c) (2008); see Donna M. Attanasio, Surveying the Risks of Carbon Dioxide:
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Also, in adopting RPSs, Congress might also consider changing the
baseline to recognize the status quo, rather than assume that each state is
beginning from the same place in developing renewable power. For ex-
ample, rather than a flat RPS requirement across all states regardless of
natural resource distribution, Congress could instead articulate a re-
quirement in terms of percentage growth in the deployment of renewable
power from the status quo for each state. This would certainly dampen
the disproportionate distributional effects of a national RPS for some
states and would ensure a more level playing field, making the national
RPS more politically appealing.
Finally, instead of leaving cost recovery completely to the vicissi-
tudes of state regulators, a national requirement that states provide for
complete cost recovery for compliance with an RPS might make the ef-
fects on firm resource allocation decisions more neutral. Absent a clear
statement by Congress preempting state regulation, cost recovery for
building renewable plants in order to comply with a national RPS or pur-
chasing RECs will be subject to the vagaries of prudence determinations
by state regulators. Especially in instances in which a new technology
proves more expensive than originally anticipated or the funding for
RECs goes to firms in another state or region of the country, state regu-
lators will be pressured to disallow some costs. Distributional impacts of
cost recovery could be further eliminated if Congress authorized regional
organizations, such as regional transmission organizations, to facilitate
cost spreading for compliance with a national RPS.
B. Alternative Financial Incentives
Moreover, from an economic perspective, the RPS is not the most
efficient lever for improving investments in renewable power and new
technologies. Even if the distributional impacts of a national RPS were
spread consistently across states, there are still problems with the fairness
and efficiency of an RPS mandate versus other approaches to encourag-
ing renewable project development. The type of subsidy reflected in a
national RPS does not provide the transparency or efficiency of an expli-
cit subsidy. The costs of RPSs, whether state or federal, are incurred by
the customers of those utilities who are subject to the RPS mandate.
Costs of encouraging development of renewable resources, which are
based on the variation of natural resources and weather conditions,
might match directly to the benefits for utilities' customers if done at a
state or regional level. This cost/benefit matching principle is the basic
premise on which cost-of-service utility ratemaking has operated: when
benefits are concentrated to specific groups of customers, it also makes
Geological Sequestration and Storage Projects in the United States, 39 ENvTL. L. REP.: NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10,376, 10,377 (2009).
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sense to concentrate costs on these customers as a matter of fairness and
efficiency.
It is questionable, however, whether a national RPS would work
this way. Because many of the purported benefits of a national RPS are
either concentrated on individual states that are rich in natural resources
(e.g., the benefits of jobs and economic development are not, in the near
term, benefits every state will experience) or are diffuse (e.g., the benefit
of reducing GHG emissions is not something unique to citizens of an in-
dividual state), 62 a national RPS is not as likely to have benefits for the
customer groups financing it. To the extent that demand is elastic (as it
is in the interstate market for electricity), many customers (at least in the
wholesale market) may substitute away from the firm that is increasing
its prices to subsidize that state's renewable energy industry. Where the
benefits of a social program are not homogenous or are diffuse across
geographic areas, a progressive national tax supporting a subsidy is a
more transparent, fairer, and more efficient way of encouraging devel-
opment of renewable projects than an implicit subsidy built into state-set
retail utility rates.
Moreover, customers would pay for a national RPS based on the
amount of power consumed.63 In this sense, the costs associated with the
subsidy will be shared among poor and wealthy customers. Although
any impact of a national RPS on aggregate customer rates may ultimately
be relatively small, its effects would almost certainly be more regressive
than the same result achieved through a uniform national subsidy-
because the costs of a uniform national subsidy would be borne by tax-
payers based on wealth, not by consumers based on usage. In the end,
whatever Congress decides to call it, a national RPS mandate does have
the effect of a tax and needs to be compared to other taxation approach-
es, including national subsidies that are supported through a progressive
income tax. Moreover, in its design, attention needs to be paid to minim-
ize the inefficiency and unfairness of an unevenly concentrated RPS.
In comparison to a national RPS, a permanent national subsidy (in
the form of grants, production tax credits, or loan guarantees) provides a
fairer and more efficient tool for promoting renewable sources of electric
62. See Wiener, supra note 2, at 1965 ("[B]ecause GHGs mix globally and have global impacts,
local abatement actions pose local costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits."). But see
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007) (recognizing a potential causal link between the con-
centration of carbon in the atmosphere from motor vehicles and the rise in global temperatures).
Others argue that individuals often look to economic considerations first-climate benefits are just
ancillary. See Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y, Spring 2007, at 10, 10 ("GHG reduction constitutes one
important benefit from greater use of renewable energy and has been an important consideration, but
in many instances, climate benefits are deemed ancillary to a variety of economic advantages.").
63. Current proposed federal statutes, such as Waxman-Markey, require utility providers to sub-
sidize the requirement to generate or purchase a certain percentage of power sold from renewable
sources. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. In turn, compliance would be paid for by each
utility by an increase in the cost of each unit of electricity it sells to customers.
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power. In terms of distributional effects, if financed by a progressive in-
come tax, such a subsidy would be shared among all states and would not
be as regressive as a national RPS. In addition, the allocation of the sub-
sidy to firms would be more politically accountable and transparent than
the implicit subsidy reflected in the mandate of a national RPS. A na-
tional subsidy may also be a more efficient, adaptive, and precise lever
for inducing investments in new technologies-though a permanent na-
tional subsidy seems to be a politically unlikely solution for addressing
the growth of renewable power in the United States.
As an alternative to a permanent national subsidy, feed-in tariffs (or
efforts to guarantee a price for the purchase of power from renewable
sources) have some clear distributional advantages over a national RPS.
In their current formulation, feed-in tariffs are subsidized by each indi-
vidual utility's customers through increased rates." Many criticize feed-
in tariffs," which are a regulatory strategy used in Europe (similar to the
approach of PURPA avoided costs, such tariffs guarantee a stream of
payments for developers of renewable projects). Feed-in tariffs, howev-
er, do not present the same distributional concerns as an RPS in the allo-
cation of the cost burden: because feed-in tariffs are unlikely to be uti-
lized by firms in resource-poor states, the costs of adopting this
regulatory strategy are more likely to be focused on states that are ripe
for development of renewable resources. From a distributional perspec-
tive, feed-in tariffs seem more desirable than a national RPS as a strategy
for promoting renewable power projects. There are inevitably some lim-
its to a state's ability to adopt feed-in tariffs, so perhaps adoption of a re-
newable feed-in tariff at the national level, akin to the approach of
PURPA, could be extended to new renewable projects-though this
would need to be financed through some sort of tax on the wholesale
price of electricity.
C. Toward Carbon-Neutral Pricing
Related to the issue of incentives, addressing deficiencies in the
pricing of carbon, whether in the form of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade,
could also make economic investments in renewable projects more at-
tractive. 6 As regulatory strategies, both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade
64. Solar Power, PEW CENTER. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/
technology/factsheet/solar (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (noting that feed-in tariff prices are paid for
through increased customer rates).
65. Davies, supra note 8, at 1391.
66. I do not intend to obfuscate the distributional and efficiency differences between a carbon
tax and cap-and-trade. Although a carbon tax may have many advantages over cap-and-trade, David
Weisbach has argued that in the domestic setting the differences between the two approaches can be
mitigated through proper design. See generally David A. Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument
Design (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Law & Econ., John M. Olin Working Paper No. 490, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1493312. To see what a carbon tax could look like,
see Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv.
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would internalize the costs associated with the carbon impacts of various
approaches to generating electricity. Effectively, carbon pricing mechan-
isms would represent a significant national tax on the usage of coal and
other fossil fuels with significant carbon impacts. Such reforms would
have much less of an effect on the cost of natural gas (which is less car-
bon intensive) than coal. Moreover, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade would
have little impact on the cost of using renewable approaches to generat-
ing electricity. Both would significantly increase the relative cost of using
coal, however, thus discouraging firms from substituting away from other
technologies toward coal. Firms will only have accurate incentives in
making decisions about the fuel mix of their electric power supply port-
folios if carbon is priced to take into account environmental harms.
Indeed, it is well recognized that, on its own, an RPS is simply un-
able to advance broader climate change goals such as GHG reduction. A
2009 study by three Department of Energy researchers concluded that
"[w]hile the RPS does help reduce emissions, it is an imperfect substitute
for cap-and-trade, even in the 2025 timeframe. This is because coal use
needs to be reduced drastically to make large emissions cuts and the RPS
does not directly address this."67 As compared to a national RPS, a cap-
and-trade system "admits a broader range of GHG abatement policies.""
One economist warns that the RPS approach "gives renewables priority
simply because they are renewables rather than because they are effi-
cient ways to mitigate pollution."9 In this sense, an RPS operates like
conventional command-and-control regulation: it "may be inefficient be-
cause it forecloses any possibility that other policies can do the same job
at a smaller cost." 0 It does not allow polluters to choose their most cost-
effective way of complying with the law, but instead mandates that more
of specified types of renewable energy technology be built."
In addition to building a more carbon-neutral subsidy mechanism
into a national RPS, a cap-and-trade system (or some other form of car-
bon pricing, such as a carbon tax) would provide clearer economic bene-
fits to the developers of renewable projects. Some economists advance
499, 502-03 (2009). Whether Congress has the political will to recognize such differences is another
matter.
67. AUDREY J. LEE ET AL., REGIONAL IMPACTS OF A NATIONAL RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD 2 (2009), available at http://www.usaee.org/usaee2009/submissions/ExtendedAbs/Audrey
Lee.doc.
68. Id.
69. Michaels, What's Not to Like, supra note 25, at 26.
70. Id. at 24.
71. A study by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) examined six scenarios for Califor-
nia's limits on GHG emissions under the state's Global Warming Solutions Act. ELEC. POWER
RESEARCH INST., PUB. No. 1014641, 1 PROGRAM ON TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA CLIMATE INITIATIVES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2-4 (2007),
http://www.epa.state.il.us/air/climatechange/documents/california-climate-study-final-report.pdf. This
study confirms that "[biroad cap-and-trade programs are more cost-effective than are command-and-
control regulations because the former can equalize the cost of avoiding an additional ton of emissions
(marginal abatement costs) across all available options." Id. at 6-7.
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this concern as an argument against any national RPS,72 but perhaps this
only means that an RPS is not as likely to be effective at advancing larger
climate change goals on its own. Put simply, a national RPS without cap-
and-trade will not have much traction in achieving carbon reduction
goals. An RPS would be a much easier political sell if it were coupled
with cap-and-trade, and as a matter of public policy, Congress should not
adopt a national RPS mandate unless it is also committed to or has
adopted cap-and-trade or some form of a carbon tax. Interest groups
who support renewable power might recognize how unsuccessful an RPS
would be on its own, without paying attention to carbon pricing.
D. Building a New Infrastructure Foundation for Renewables
Perhaps most significantly, discussion of a national RPS highlights
the inadequacy of the traditional approach of deferring to state and local
regulators regarding siting infrastructure, the setting of rates, and basic
fuel mix in the context of electric power systems. Limited transmission
infrastructure remains one of the largest obstacles to widespread de-
ployment of renewable resources.73 A recent study prepared for the Na-
tional Renewable Energy Laboratory suggests that it is feasible for wind
power to constitute twenty to thirty percent of the electric generation ca-
pacity for the eastern two-thirds of the United States, but it would re-
quire the investment of over $100 billion in transmission infrastructure.74
Among those states that have adopted an RPS, states that have ad-
dressed siting obstacles (Texas among them) have had the most success
in meeting their RPS goals." Those states that have not addressed siting,
such as California, have fallen short of their RPS goals.76 Because the sit-
ing of renewable facilities involves competing land use concerns, as well
as larger economic concerns related to the "need" for additional infra-
structure, state and local regulators have continued to assert authority
over such decisions.77
The legal barriers to transmission expansion are significant. State
and local opposition to new transmission line projects based on a narrow
understanding of benefits (as benefitting only in-state customers) has li-
72. Michaels, What's Not to Like, supra note 25, at 27.
73. See BRACKEN HENDRICKS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WIRED FOR PROGRESS: BUILDING A
NATIONAL CLEAN-ENERGY SMART GRID 2-3 (2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/20091
02/pdflelectricity-grid.pdf.
74. ENERNEX CORP., EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION AND TRANSMISSION STUDY 74-80, 114
(2010), http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/ewits-final-report.pdf; see also Mat-
thew L. Wald, Wind Power for the East Said Attainable, at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/business/energy-environment/21wind.html.
75. See Michael Giberson, Texas Wind Power: It Isn't About the RPS, KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM
(May 18, 2010, 8:44 AM), http://knowledgeproblem.com/2010/05/18/texas-wind-power-it-isnt-about-
the-rps/.
76. See Michaels, What's Not to Like, supra note 25, at 16-19.
77. See Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory Context, 37 ECOLOGY
L.Q. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=15670 7 7.
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mited the approval of transmission infrastructure that is essential to the
development of new renewable power projects in the Southwest, areas of
the Dakotas and the Rockies, and coastal areas in the eastern United
States.8 Congress has recognized the problem with leaving transmission
planning and siting entirely within the hands of state regulators, there-
fore expanding federal authority over transmission line siting in limited
circumstances. 9 Pending reform proposals would afford federal authori-
ties expanded backstop authority to override state or local regulators
when there are significant national interests in the development of re-
newable power projects, while retaining considerable input and initial
decision-making authority at the state and local level."
There are also substantial cost-allocation obstacles to building new
infrastructure for renewable resources. Who should bear the costs of
new transmission infrastructure is an issue that deeply divides states in
certain regions of the country and will require an explicit cost-allocation
solution between producers and consumers of electric power from new
renewable projects." Renewable project developers and customers in
large urban areas, for example, stand to benefit from transmission up-
grades in the Midwest, but utilities that do not stand to immediately ben-
efit have opposed efforts to regionalize the costs of these projects in
transmission rates.82 In a recent Seventh Circuit case, Judge Richard
Posner wrote an opinion that, for the first time, required the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to quantify the benefits from
allocating the costs of new transmission for renewable power projects."
Highlighting the strong divergence of opinion about who should pay for
new transmission, Judge Richard Cudahy, dissenting in part, emphasized
the need for regional sharing of transmission costs, even when network
reliability benefits could not be precisely quantified.' Such cost-
allocation issues remain one of the most contentious issues in the energy
industry today.85
Most significantly, discussions regarding a national RPS highlight
how decisions regarding the planning and siting of new power plants re-
late to regional and national fuel mix concerns, and increasingly are no
78. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 11, at 709-13.
79. See id. at 741.
80. For further discussion, see id. at 746-48.
81. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 576 F.3d 470, 473 (7th
Cir. 2009).
82. See, e.g., id. at 473-74.
83. Id. at 477.
84. Id. at 479-80 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. As exemplified in a Texas court's decision to reverse and remand a Public Utility Commis-
sion to approve billions in new transmission lines for failure to consider lower-cost options that would
benefit customers. See Tom Fowler, Judge Orders Halt to Work on Wind Transmission Project,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 15, 2010, 10:08 PM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/
energy/6818579.html. For further discussion of the significance of the issue of cost allocation for new
transmission, see Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority,
39 ENvTL. L. 1015 (2009).
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longer purely state and local issues. Decisions regarding the planning
and siting of power plants-as well as decisions about fuel mix and power
generation portfolios-are historically (and for the most part remain)
squarely within the jurisdictional authority of state and local regulators.?
Although a national RPS would make renewable fuel mix an issue of na-
tional concern, one problem I have highlighted is that the RPS fails to
address fuel mix beyond renewable resources -including how the coal
and natural gas will continue to play an important role in the operation
of utility systems. State and local regulators considering siting and oper-
ation decisions for utilities focus almost entirely on the benefits to their
in-state customers.' As the debate over a national RPS highlights, the
decisions regarding what kind of plant to build and where to build are no
longer purely state and local issues and cannot be resolved without some
attention to the broader impacts of decisions on regional and national
goals."8
Looking to the future of energy law, new approaches to allow re-
gional or federal regulation (with a large range of fuel mix concerns in
mind) may be necessary in those instances in which state or local gov-
ernments fail to approve plants for reasons that reflect parochial state
concerns. Regional bodies are already taking an active interest in the
planning of infrastructure to encourage renewable power projects."
These bodies may ultimately be able to handle the complex coordination
issues that arise when individual states refuse to approve power plants to
meet broader interstate interests; but, as with transmission, additional
proposals to expand regional or federal authority over the planning and
siting of power plants may prove necessary in the future. Such changes
anticipate a growing shift in the balance of federal-state power in energy
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should not be surprising that to date Congress has failed to adopt
a national RPS. As I have argued, in its present form the proposed na-
tional RPS imposes geographically disproportionate economic costs and
its most salient benefits also tend to be at the state and local level. By
highlighting the questionable political economy of a national RPS, I do
not intend to dismiss any benefits of national attention to renewable
86. See Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23, 23-24 (discussing state and local role in power plant siting).
87. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 11, at 721-26 (discussing emphasis on in-state benefit in state
transmission siting proceedings).
88. Though the scope of the problem may be regional, there are adaptive advantages to state
regulators retaining primary authority over such decisions, particularly given the complexity and var-
iability of various geographic solutions to climate change problems such as the fuel mix of power
plants. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocat-
ing Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1796 (2008).
89. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 11, at 761-76.
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energy. National subsidies and tax credits can make a large difference, as
could larger national attention to infrastructure, transmission, and power
plant siting. And certainly some pieces of a national RPS would be de-
sirable in completing the puzzle for the energy law's future strategy.
For example, by articulating standards for a state's recognition of
renewable power generated elsewhere, Congress can facilitate market
unification for renewable credits. A nationally unified renewable credit
market is a clear improvement over the status quo to the extent that it
promotes the stability of state regulation and encourages each state to
take an ambitious approach to promoting renewable projects, one that is
tailored to its regional and natural resource situation. Any political
economy claim that an RPS requires a strong national solution as a
mandate for firms appears to be weak, however, given that the climate
change benefits of a national RPS are questionable. The main costs of
adopting a national RPS mandate will be borne by one set of states, with
the benefits accruing primarily to states that do not bear the costs.
As a practical policy matter, a more comprehensive approach to
energy policy is the only way to ensure that a national RPS meets its
stated goals-even then its political economy foundations as a national,
rather than a state or local, solution seem shaky. The national regulatory
approach to achieving these goals needs to begin by confronting broader
system-wide barriers to the development of renewable projects in the
electric power industry, rather than embracing simple fixes that cannot
accomplish what they purport to.
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